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In 2013, under threat of a resident petition and, at worst, an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) order that
would unilaterally impose new electoral districts, the City of Toronto embarked on its first ward boundary
review (WBR) since the enactment of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (COTA). The WBR highlighted the
scattered application of subsidiarity within Canada’s federation. Under the notion of federalism enshrined
in the Canadian Constitution, municipalities are granted only those powers that derive from provincial
legislation. However, the Supreme Court of Canada has invoked the European principle of “subsidiarity” to
reframe municipal authority over local issues. The aim of this principle is to guarantee a degree of
independence for a local authority in relation to a higher body or central government, in order to ensure
that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as possible. These two seemingly competing notions of
municipal authority—federalism and subsidiarity—can and ought to be reconciled in the context of
Canadian local governments. This article analyzes Toronto’s WBR in light of the subsidiarity debate.
Drawing principally on the work of Yishai Blank and Hoi Kong, this article asks how legal theory
understands local decision-making, exploring in particular whether and how subsidiarity articulates
federalism’s claims. Through a detailed review of its WBR, the article suggests that Toronto’s decisions
are a manifestation of the city’s view of its powers as operating within a federalist lens, leaving it
reactionary to privincial decisions and quasi-judicial review. At the same time, provincial laws that set
municipal authority in WBRs are framed within a contradictory framework that undermine the
accountability of Toronto’s WBR process. The article argues in favour of a re-imagination of municipal
authority under the notion of “operative subsidiarity” nesting within a federalist framework.

Keywords
Subsidiarity; Administrative and political divisions; Local government; Toronto (Ont.)

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0
License.

This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol56/iss2/2

271

Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal
Authority: The Case of Toronto’s Ward
Boundary Review
ALEXANDRA FLYNN*

I.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY............ 274

II.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION................. 281

III.

MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY AND LEGISLATIVE DESIGNTHE CASE OF TORONTO’S WARD
BOUNDARY REVIEW........................................................................................................................... 287
A.
Municipal Authority and Legislative Design....................................................................... 287
B.
Municipal Ward Boundary Reviews..................................................................................... 290
C.
Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review........................................................................................ 294
D.
Provincial Override of Toronto’s Ward Boundaries............................................................. 296
E.
Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Ward Boundaries.................................................... 297

IV.

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................... 299

In 2013, under threat of a resident petition and, at worst, an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB)
order that would unilaterally impose new electoral districts, the City of Toronto embarked on
its first ward boundary review (WBR) since the enactment of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (COTA).
The WBR highlighted the scattered application of subsidiarity within Canada’s federation.
Under the notion of federalism enshrined in the Canadian Constitution, municipalities are
granted only those powers that derive from provincial legislation. However, the Supreme
Court of Canada has invoked the European principle of “subsidiarity” to reframe municipal
authority over local issues. The aim of this principle is to guarantee a degree of independence
for a local authority in relation to a higher body or central government, in order to ensure
that powers are exercised as close to the citizen as possible. These two seemingly competing
notions of municipal authority—federalism and subsidiarity—can and ought to be reconciled
in the context of Canadian local governments. This article analyzes Toronto’s WBR in light
*
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of the subsidiarity debate. Drawing principally on the work of Yishai Blank and Hoi Kong,
this article asks how legal theory understands local decision-making, exploring in particular
whether and how subsidiarity articulates federalism’s claims. Through a detailed review of its
WBR, the article suggests that Toronto’s decisions are a manifestation of the city’s view of its
powers as operating within a federalist lens, leaving it reactionary to privincial decisions and
quasi-judicial review. At the same time, provincial laws that set municipal authority in WBRs
are framed within a contradictory framework that undermine the accountability of Toronto’s
WBR process. The article argues in favour of a re-imagination of municipal authority under
the notion of “operative subsidiarity” nesting within a federalist framework.

IN 2017, JUSTIN TRUDEAU, Canada’s optimistic and youthful Prime Minister,

made unprecedented remarks in a room full of municipal leaders:

We know our country is only as strong as the towns and cities we’re made of. We’re
only as strong as our rec centres and social housing, our wastewater and public
transit. We heard you when you said you needed a strong partner in Ottawa.1

These phrases suggest that municipalities have a direct governmentto-government relationship with the federal government. But the remarks lie in
stark contrast to the tattered 150-year-old pages of the Constitution Act, 1867,2
where a city or town can do whatever the province empowers them to do, but not
more.3 This article focuses on these contrasting messages of municipal authority,
which I argue continue to be muddied in Canada. I reflect the potential of a
particular legal principle—subsidiarity—to resolve these contrasting messages
when it comes to the design of provincial legislation.
Until the 1990s, the judiciary endorsed unilateral provincial acts like
amalgamations without requiring municipal consent and upheld a narrow
interpretation of municipal action.4 Since then, the Supreme Court of Canada
(SCC) has gradually invoked a broader interpretation of municipal action. One
of the tools of interpretation adopted by the SCC was the principle of subsidiarity,
a notion borrowed from the European Union, which advocates that decisions be
made at the lowest level of government when appropriate and possible. The aim
of this principle is to guarantee a degree of independence for a local authority
in relation to a higher body or central government to ensure that powers are
1.

2.
3.
4.

Federation of Canadian Municipalities, News Release, “Prime Minister highlights
nation-building partnership with Canada’s local governments” (2 June 2017), online: FCM
Media <www.fcm.ca/en/news-media/news-release/prime-minister-highlights-nation-buildingpartnership-canadas-local> [perma.cc/EJA9-9ENY].
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
See Ron Levi & Mariana Valverde, “Freedom of the City: Canadian Cities and the Quest for
Governmental Status” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 409 at 416.
Stanley Makuch, Neil Craik & Signe B Leisk, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law, 2nd
ed (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 82.

Flynn, Operative Subsidiarity and Municipal Authority 273

exercised closest to citizens. In Canada, the courts are clear that the notion of
subsidiarity cannot contradict the Constitution, meaning that municipal action
must be read in light of the powers granted to municipalities by provinces.5
However, subsidiarity alerts us to another way of understanding municipal
power: As a principle that understands the municipality as a government with
broad authority to make decisions for their constituents.
This article analyzes what the principle of subsidiarity means for
municipalities, arguing in favour of “operative subsidiarity” in the design of
provincial legislation. First, I outline the meaning and origins of subsidiarity,
including critiques in the potential of its application. Second, I discuss the
judicial treatment of municipal authority in Canada over the last twenty years.
I argue that municipal authority as interpreted by the SCC has increasingly made
room for municipalities as governments deserving of deference, unless the action
breaches fairness or human rights. However, despite this judicial evolution,
provinces have not drafted legislation with the principle of subsidiarity in mind,
leading to unintended consequences as a result of the interplay between laws.
This means that while municipalities, especially cities, are asserting a stronger role
in national debates, a complex reading of multiple laws mires their ability to act
and ultimately complicates decisions once made.
To animate the state of municipal authority, I focus on Toronto’s ward
boundary review (WBR), which began in 2013 by City Council resolution
and concluded in early 2018 following quasi-judicial involvement. In 2018,
the Province of Ontario introduced legislation to use the 25 federal and
provincial electoral districts as the city’s wards. The WBR was the first electoral
boundary review undertaken by the City of Toronto since the enactment of the
City of Toronto Act, 20066 (COTA), whereby Toronto was granted increased
decision-making power, including the design of its electoral model and
boundaries. Despite this purported independence, the city’s WBR was hampered
by two “bookends” of provincial constraints: limits to its delegated powers under
COTA and constraints imposed by Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) oversight,
which was renamed in 2018 as the Local Planning Appeals Tribunal (LPAT).
Even before the provincial government overturned the city’s chosen 47-ward
model, Toronto’s WBR process was based on mixed legislative messages, with
a contradictory framework that left the city reactionary to provincial decisions
and quasi-judicial review. This section details the labourous provincial framework

5.
6.

Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, [2010] 3 SCR 457 at para 72.
City of Toronto Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 11, Schedule A.
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related to the drawing of ward boundaries and the eventual mid-election override
of the city’s decision.
The article concludes with an explanation of how operative subsidiarity
can help in reconciling multiple pieces of provincial legislation that conflict
and confuse the scale of municipal authority. I draw from the work of Yishai
Blank, who argues that subsidiarity, although messy and fragmented, offers a
place for cities of divergent sizes and powers to assume authority, but necessitates
thoughtful decisions on where power should rest, and from Hoi Kong, who
also seeks to operationalize the principle.7 When applied to intra vires decisions,
operative subsidiarity provides a means of evaluating whether provinces have
adequately devolved power to the municipal scale. In the case of the WBR,
operative subsidiarity clarifies that the Province of Ontario’s decision to
reconfigure the city’s wards mid-election was not a discrete action, but part of a
larger legislative blackbox in relation to municipal decision-making and electoral
districts. This article proposes that the principle of operative subsidiarity be
applied to re-conceptualize municipal authority to comply with the expansive
principles espoused by courts and enable a consistent approach to provincial
legislative design concerning municipal authority.

I. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
Nicholas Blomley remarks that, “Jurisdictions are conceived as technical devices,
sorting mechanisms that can be used to allocate people and objects to particular
categories.”8 One of these sorting devices is the municipality.9 While early
jurisprudence debated whether municipalities were to be considered governments
or corporations under the law, it is now well established that municipal decisions

7.

8.
9.

In this article, “municipal” or “city” means the one or more statutes that give municipal
corporations their powers. The term “city” is, in statutory terms in Ontario, undefined. The
most recent set of municipal statutes removed references to titles like “city,” “town,” and
“village.” Municipal Act, 2001, SO 2001, c 25, s 457(1).
Nicholas Blomley, “What Sort of a Legal Space is a City?” in Andrea Mubi Brighenti,
ed, Urban Interstices: The Aesthetics and the Politics of the In-Between (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2013) 1 at 5.
While this article focuses on the municipal, provincial and federal scales, please note that the
principle of subsidiarity has been invoked to argue that the neighbourhood should be granted
legal power in decision-making. See e.g. Jerry Frug, “Decentering Decentralization” (1993)
60 U Chicago L Rev 253.
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are subject to review per the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.10 Courts in particular
have interpreted the provisions of provincial legislation as enabling municipalities
to function as governments based on powers delegated from the provincial
legislatures, and have held that municipalities must be able to govern based on
the best interests of their residents and conceptions of the public good.11
This recognition by the courts is echoed in the public domain. Cities and
their mayors are increasingly important players within the country. In the case of
Toronto, the country’s largest municipality, this importance is reflected in decisions
of the federal government to transfer billions of dollars and empowering the
city to make final spending decisions;12 political agency, whereby the provincial
government refused to step in to remove Toronto’s mayor;13 and oversight, where
the City successfully argued that more expansive provincial ombudsman powers
should not apply to Toronto’s affairs.14 Scholars, including Ron Levi and Mariana
Valverde, opined that this increasing recognition of municipal power by federal
10. See generally Robert G. Doumani & Jane Matthews Glenn, “Property, Planning and the
Charter” (1989) 34 McGill LJ 1036. Also note Re McCutcheon and City of Toronto (1983),
41 OR (2d) 652 at para 3 (ONSC), where Linden J stated, “[m]unicipalities, though a
distinct level of government for some purposes, have no constitutional status; they are merely
“creatures of the legislature,” with no existence independent of the legislature or government
of each province. Hence, just as the provincial legislatures and governments are bound by
the Charter, so too are municipalities, whose by-laws and other actions must be considered,
for the purposes of s 32(1), as actions of the provincial government, which gave them birth
[emphasis added]”. See Alexandra Flynn, “The legal case against Ford’s assault on local
democracy,” Spacing Magazine (30 July 2018): online: <spacing.ca>. See also Yishai Blank,
“Localism in the New Global Legal Order” (2006) 47:1 Harvard Intl LJ 263; and David J
Barron, “A Localist Critique of the New Federalism” (2001) 51 Duke LJ 377.
11. Pacific National Investment Ltd v Victoria (City), 2000 SCC 64.
12. See e.g. Government of Canada, “The Federal Gas Tax Fund: Permanent and Predictable
Funding forMunicipalities” (12 April 2017), online: <www.infrastructure.gc.ca/plan/
gtf-fte-eng.html> [perma.cc/SS2W-CCVJ]. The Federal Gas Tax Fund, a federal
infrastructure funding program that gives funding directly to municipalities, including $152
million per year to the City of Toronto.
13. Adrian Morrow “Ontario Minister says stripping Ford of mayoralty powers was legal,
appropriate,” The Globe and Mail (19 November 2013), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/toronto/municipal-affairs-minister-says-stripping-rob-ford-of-mayoralty-powers-waslegal-appropriate/article15510564> [perma.cc/42V6-3H8K].
14. See e.g. Adrian Morrow “Ontario set to strengthen Ombudsman’s powers,” The
Globe and Mail (6 March 2014), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
ontario-set-to-strengthen-watchdogs-powers/article17339860> [perma.cc/R4VK-8TMV];
Ontario Ombudsman, “Who we oversee: Municipalities” (17 April 2017), online:
<www.ombudsman.on.ca/About-Us/Who-We-Oversee/Municipalities.aspx>. In 2014, the
Ontario Ombudsman proposed an expansion of their scope of powers to include oversight
over municipal actions. Initially, this included the power to investigate Toronto decisions, but
following this proposal was dropped following objections from the City of Toronto.
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and provincial governments and the courts speak to the power of local residents;
municipalities have the ears, perhaps better than any other level of government,
of the many people that reside within their boundaries.15
The principle of subsidiarity is one way that scholars have made sense of
local power. The roots of the term trace back to religious philosopher Thomas
Aquinas, who asked fundamental questions about the relationship between the
delegation of political power and the representation of civil society.16 Subsidiarity
means, “the smallest possible social or political entities should have all the rights
and powers they need to regulate their own affairs freely and effectively.”17 Peter
Hogg describes subsidiarity as “a principle of social organization that prescribes
that decisions affecting individuals should, as far as possible, be made by the
level of government closest to the individuals affected,”18 with the idea that
government powers should always reside at the lowest level possible.19 We can
conceive of subsidiarity as either negative, whereby the larger-scaled entity must
not intervene when the smaller can manage its affairs on its own, or positive,
where subsidiarity requires that a larger entity must be given explicit powers to
accomplish its goals.20
To Yishai Blank, federalism and subsidiarity advance competing versions of
the state.21 He writes that each of these principles of government
presents a different view of the state and its relationship with society; each manifests
a distinct approach to the role of cities in the act of government; each advocates
different sets of political identification and relationships among spheres of human
existence; and each is organized through different legal principles, institutions and
procedures.22

Blank offers two distinctions between these principles. First, subsidiarity
recognizes more than two jurisdictions (the central government and the province
or state).23 In contrast, federalism “does not theorize cities,” leaving them as the
15. Levi & Valverde, supra note 3 at 424.
16. Eugénie Brouillet, Canadian Federalism and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Should We Open
Pandora’s Box?: Proceedings from Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference, Toronto,
2011 (Toronto: Supreme Court Law Review in association with Osgoode Hall Law School,
2011) 601 at 604.
17. Ibid at 605.
18. Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2002) at 114.
19. Yishai Blank, “Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of
Global Multilevel Governance” (2010) 37 Fordham Urb LJ 510 at 533.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid at 522.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid at 533.
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responsibility of each individual province or state.24 Subsidiarity recognizes the
“uniqueness of every social sphere and its place in the total social structure,”
including villages and communities that pre-dated the creation of the state.25
Thus, the idea that power should reside at the “closest” level possible cannot be
perceived in a technical or absolute manner; it is, instead, a substantive term that
seeks to find the right ‘fit’ between the activity in question and the governing
unit.26 Second, subsidiarity calls for a positive autonomy towards constituent
units, whereas federalism asserts a negative autonomy, meaning that one
governing unit should not interfere with the conduct of another.27 Subsidiarity
does not focus on strict executive competencies in each jurisdiction.28 Under
subsidiarity, each unit should make its decisions without intervention, but it
should be assisted by other units if needed to achieve the asserted goal.
In essence, subsidiarity is a dynamic rather than a rigid principle that offers
“a degree of flexibility to governance by striking a balance between respect for
the diverse entities present and a level of state cohesion.”29 Subsidiarity is a more
flexible legal principle that accommodates the involvement of multiple scales
in decision-making.30 To Blank, subsidiarity is messy and fragmented, offering
a place for cities of divergent sizes and powers to assume authority for matters
like housing and homelessness, which federalism struggles to accommodate.31
This notion of subsidiarity also has echoes in Boaventura de Sousa Santos’
notion of scale. Santos stated that “laws are maps; written laws are cartographic
maps; customary, informal laws are mental maps.”32 Santos offers an analogy
between maps and law by distinguishing between “large scale” and “small scale.”
A large-scale map shows less land but far more detail (“a miniaturized version of
reality”) and small-scale more land, showing relative positions, but ultimately less
detail.33 Scale differs in its presentation of detail or relative positions, and it may
“zoom in” on particular phenomena. Scale is relevant in how law is crafted as “laws
use different criteria to determine the meaningful details and the relevant features
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid at 549.
Ibid at 541.
Ibid at 542.
Ibid at 542.
Ibid at 533.
Brouillet, supra note 16 at 606.
Frug, supra note 9.
Blank, supra note 19 at 546.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading – Toward a Postmodern
Conception of Law” (1987) 14 JL & Soc’y 281 at 282.
33. Ibid at 283.
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of the activity to be regulated.”34 Municipal action is, in a sense, a “zooming
in” on a localized area. The scale is the zoomed-in city, enabling a more careful
consideration of the policies and decisions that affect a localized area. Subsidiarity
acts as a legal principle to include this scale in its decision-making model but
recognizes that the subject matter of this more careful focus may extend beyond
the enumerated powers that a province grants a municipality.
A main critique of the principle of subsidiarity is the difficulty in its
application.35 Alain Delcamp states: “It is evident that the notion of subsidiarity is
unfocused and cannot itself, except with great difficulty, generate legal effects.”36
To Delcamp, the dynamic nature of subsidiarity means that there are many
arguments as to which localized institutions and boundaries are the idealized
sites for decision-making and how (and when) they can be empowered to act,
including scales within and beyond the municipality, such as neighbourhoods.37
The rationality of subsidiarity enables localized governance, yet the lack of
precision in the specific roles of formal units of governance leads to confusion
in as to how to rightly apply the principle. Blank is more optimistic about its
normative potential, citing as an example the Lisbon Treaty, which mentions the
importance of consultation at the local level in order to advance the principle of
34. Ibid at 287.
35. Note the other main area of critique, including the appropriateness of subsidiarity in light
of rule of law, human rights, judicial review, and public choice. See e.g. George A Bermann,
“Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States” (1994) 94 Colum L Rev 331 (whether the principle of subsidiarity is justiciable).
See e.g. Daniel T Murphy, “Subsidiarity And/Or Human Rights” (1994) 29 U Rich L Rev
67; Dinah Shelton, “Subsidiarity, Democracy and Human Rights” in Donna Gomien,
ed, Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Asbjorn Eide (New York,
Oxford, 1993) 43 (concerns regarding subsidiarity and adequate protection of human
rights). See e.g. Paolo G Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International
Human Rights Law” (2003) 97 AJIL 38; James W Skillen & Rockne M McCarthy, “Three
Views of Social Pluralism: A Critical Evaluation” in James W Skillen & Rockne M McCarthy
eds, Political Order and the Plural Structure of Society (Georgia, Scholars Press, 1991) at 357
(subsidiarity as a paradoxical principle that both limits yet empowers and justifies the state).
See e.g. Rodolfo Sacco, “Diversity and Uniformity in the Law” (2001) 49 Am J Comp Law
171 (subsidiarity’s potential to reduce the consistency and uniformity of the law). See e.g.
Steven G Calabresi & Lucy D Bickford, “Federalism and Subsidiarity: Perspectives from
U.S. Constitutional Law” (2014) 55 Nomos 123; Vicki C Jackson, “Subsidiarity, the Judicial
Role, and the Warren Court’s Contribution to the Revival of State Government” (2014) 55
Nomos 190 (whether or not subsidiarity is linked to economics and externalities). These and
other critiques regarding subsidiarity are not addressed here given the scope of this article.
36. Alain Delcamp, “Principe de subsidiarité et décentralisation” (1993) 23 Rev fr dr constl 609
at 623, translated in Brouillet, supra note 16 at 611.
37. Frug, supra note 9.
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subsidiarity.38 This, he argues, leaves open the possibility that the dynamic, flexible
nature of subsidiarity can lead to specific outcomes. Some scholars suggest that
even where subsidiarity is codified, it may be non-justiciable.39 However, in some
jurisdictions, codification then prevents interference; for example, in South
Africa national or provincial laws only prevail over the municipality where they
do not “compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise.”40
Given the normative aims of this article, I turn to Hoi Kong’s characterization
of the Canadian federalism, which he asserts was “structured to safeguard a set of
collective interests.”41 Kong states:
When the activities that constitute a nation (including activities tied to the
creation of a common public culture) and the goods that flow from these activities
(including goods relating to the individual autonomy of group members) require
state institutions that are controlled by members of the nation, nations can make a
plausible claim to a measure of self-government.42

In Kong’s view, subsidiarity can be incorporated into Canadian federalism.43
To Kong, subsidiarity serves as a means to limit the federal government’s autonomy
and to require deliberation rather than unilateral decision-making.44 Put another
way, subsidiarity tempers top-down state autonomy by acknowledging that its
decisions affect other scales of government.45
Building on Kong’s account, I suggest that subsidiarity can be operationalized
to address the reality of multiple scales of government action. I advance the notion
of “operative subsidiarity,” which means that the provincial government would
first look to the policy area to be addressed, prior to determining the appropriate
38. Treaty of Lisbon, 13 December 2007, OJ (C306) 50 (entered in force on 1 December 2009,
amending the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community). It states:
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence,
the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at the central level or at regional and local
level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved
at the Union level.

39. Clayton P Gillette, “The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments” (1997)
83 Va L Rev 1347.
40. Nico Steytler, “The powers of local government in decentralised systems of government:
managing the ‘curse of common competencies’” (2005) 38 Comp & Intl LJS Afr 271 at 283.
41. Hoi Kong, “Subsidiarity, Republicanism and the Division of Powers in Canada” (2015)
45 RDUS 13 at 26.
42. Ibid at 26.
43. Ibid at 30.
44. Ibid at 35.
45. Ibid at 37.
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scale, and then “each and every service, function, or responsibility needs to be
thought of afresh.”46 As Paul Schiff Berman writes, “a subsidiarity regime does
not pose an outright bar to governance at the ‘higher’ level of authority. But
it does not offer a blank check either. The idea is to foster careful and repeated
consideration of other potential lawmaking communities.”47 While the principle
of subsidiarity accepts that there will likely be intergovernmental approaches,
it assumes that primary policy empowerment will be placed at the scale of a
particular government.48 It is not a presumption that the local government
is always equipped or appropriate to oversee every policy area that touches a
municipality; instead, there must be an assessment taken based on the needs and
resources in question.49
I argue that operative subsidiarity is a standard that allows us to ask whether
a provincial government has decided on the appropriate government scale of
policy action and has then ensured that all other provincial legislation permits
the government to fully act. Subsidiarity offers a lens by which all provincial
legislation can be assessed, based on how it works together, as to whether or not
a local government has been given the authority to act.50 In dissent in Reference
re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Supreme Court of Canada Justices LeBel
and Deschamps wrote, “this is where the principle of subsidiarity could apply,
not as an independent basis for the distribution of legislative powers, but as an
interpretive principle.”51 What differs in this account is that operative subsidiarity
may provide a basis for understanding how provincial legislative design affects
the exercise of municipal power; not just in one empowering statute, but across
all legislation that affects the local government. Before setting out the case of
Toronto’s ward boundaries, which provides a fulsome illustration of the potential
application of operative subsidiarity, the next section sets out judicial treatment
of municipal authority.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Blank, supra note 19 at 536.
Paul Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism” (2007) 80 S Cal L Rev 1155 at 1208.
Blank, supra note 19 at 557.
Berman, supra note 47 at 1209.
Jacob Levy, “Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties” (2007) 101 Am Pol Sci
Rev 459 at 462.
51. Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61 at para 273.
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
The legal story of municipal power continues to evolve in Canada. In this story,
the courts play a fundamental role. Under section 92(8) of the Constitution Act,
1867,52 municipal status and jurisdiction are crystal clear: “Municipal institutions”
are within the province’s exclusive authority and have no protection against
changes imposed on them by provinces.53 It is this constitutional luminosity that
have led municipalities to be called “creatures of the province,” with provincial
governments empowered to set rules regarding what municipalities can and cannot
do.54 This means that the review of government decisions looks very different for
municipalities than their federal or provincial counterparts; municipalities are
“entities with a defined jurisdictional sphere, are required to act within their
appointed jurisdictional limits, and failure to do so may result in the courts
quashing the municipal action as ultra vires, or beyond its legal competence.”55
The interpretation of Canadian municipal power can be traced to the origins
of municipalities under English law, which were not designed as democratically
accountable.56 Their place within Canada’s federal fabric was also framed by a
nineteenth-century doctrine of municipal authority known as “Dillon’s Rule,”
which resulted in the first comprehensive municipal act. Dillon’s Rule refers to
the framework established by John Dillon, an American jurist who objected to
“municipal largesse and waste.”57 Under this doctrine of “prescribed powers,”
municipalities can act only when expressly authorized by statute, which is
to be interpreted narrowly.58 Dillon’s Rule suggests a relationship between
municipalities and provinces is like that of a parent and child, with provinces
keeping a “watchful eye” on how municipal powers are exercised in concern that
they will be inappropriately used.59 On a practical level, it means that municipal
authority may not be exercised unless a province grants these governments the
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Constitution Act, supra note 2.
Makuch, Craik & Leisk, supra note 4 at 81.
Levi & Valverde, supra note 3 at 416.
Makuch, Craik & Leisk, supra note 4 at 81.
Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective (Oxford University
Press, 2015) at 3-5; Makuch, Craik & Leisk, supra note 4 at 82.
57. Levi & Valverde, supra note 3 at 418.
58. Ibid at 416. See also Makuch, Craik & Leisk, supra note 4 at 82.
59. Eugene Meehan, Robert Chiarelli & Marie-France Major, “The Constitutional Legal Status
of Municipalities 1849-2004: Success is a Journey, But Also a Destination” (2007) 22 NJCL
1 at 4-5. See also Levi & Valverde, supra note 3 at 416.
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power to do so, although this authority can be implicit.60 The SCC referenced
Dillon’s Rule most recently in 1993 in R v Greenbaum, a case involving a street
vendor who was unable to receive a permit to sell t-shirts on Toronto streets as
a result of a city by-law.61 In critiquing the city’s exercise of unauthorized power,
Justice Iacobucci stated:
The courts, as a result of this inferior legal position [of municipalities], have
traditionally interpreted narrowly statutes respecting grants of powers to
municipalities. This approach may be described as ‘Dillon’s rule,’ which states that
a municipality may exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those
powers necessarily or fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those
indispensable powers essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation of the
purposes of the corporation.62

Although cities are left out of the Constitution as a level of government,63 the
interpretation by the courts of municipal power has evolved.64 In 1997, the notion
of cities as “creatures of the legislature” was fervently articulated in the decision
of the East York (Borough) v Ontario (Attorney General).65 This case challenged the
unilateral decision of the Province of Ontario to amalgamate one regional and six
lower-tier municipalities into the Toronto megacity in 1998 without consent of
the affected municipalities. While referencing the lack of evidence of consultation
and the vast number of people who voted against the amalgamation in locally-held
referendums, the Superior Court concluded that the unilateral action did not
exceed the province’s constitutional authority to make laws relating to municipal
institutions in the province. The court determined that the power to restructure
Toronto is within provincial authority under the Constitution Act and set out
four “clear” principles regarding the constitutional status of Canadian cities:66
(1) municipal institutions lack constitutional status; (2) municipal institutions
are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial legislation so provides;
(3) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers
are subject to abolition or repeal by provincial legislation; and (4) municipal

60.
61.
62.
63.

R v Greenbaum, [1993] 1 SCR 674 at 688-89.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See e.g. Daniel Weinstock, “Federalism and Cities” in James E Fleming and Jacob T Levy,
eds, Federalism and Subsidiarity (New York: New York University Press, 2014) 259.
64. Morton v British Columbia (Agriculture and Lands), 2009 BCSC 136 at para 109.
65. East York (Borough) v Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 34 OR (3d) 789 (Gen Div), aff’d
(1997), 36 OR (3d) 733 (CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1998] 1 SCR vii.
66. Ibid at 797–98.
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institutions may exercise only those powers which should be that which are
conferred upon them by statute.
In contrast to these “clear” principles, there is more nuance when it comes to
the interpretation of the intra vires actions taken by local governments. In Shell
Canada Products v Vancouver (City), the SCC considered the proper interpretation
of municipal power.67 This case concerned the City of Vancouver, which resolved
not to do business with Shell, relying on an omnibus provision to justify the
action. In Shell, the dispute between the justices was not based on the proper
construction of municipal powers, but instead the purpose of the municipality.
The majority ruled against the City of Vancouver based on the view that the
impugned resolutions were not passed for a municipal purpose, preferring a
narrow construction over a broad and purposive interpretation. The majority held
that the City of Vancouver did not have the authority to make such a decision.
However, the case included a strong dissent authored by Justice McLachlin (as
she then was), who argued in favour of judicial deference for elected municipal
bodies on the democratic basis that their purpose is to serve the people who
elected them.68 Justice McLachlin rooted her argument in the proposition that
the construction of statutes relating to municipal authority should be subject to
a more expansive interpretation, stating that “[i]f municipalities are to be able
to respond to the needs and wishes of their citizens, they must be given a broad
jurisdiction to make local decisions reflecting local values.”69
A short time later, Justice McLachlin’s dissent would be reflected in two
majority decisions, Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking70 and 114957 Canada Ltee
(Spraytech, Societye d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town).71 In the 2001 Spraytech decision,
the SCC again considered whether a municipal by-law that restricted the use
of pesticides was ultra vires, or beyond the authority of a local government.
In Spraytech,72 the Court allowed the town of Hudson, Québec to ban the
use of aesthetic pesticides, although considered non-toxic by provincial and
federal regulators.73 The SCC considered whether the “impossibility of dual
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

[1994] 1 SCR 231 at 244 [Shell].
Ibid. See also Horton v Greater Sudbury (City of ), 66 OR (3d) 359 16 at para 26 (ONSC).
Ibid at 32.
Nanaimo (City) v Rascal Trucking Ltd, [2000] 1 SCR 342 [Rascal Trucking].
114957 Canada Ltee (Spraytech, Societe d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 SCR
241 [Spraytech].
72. Ibid.
73. Ian M Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed (Toronto:
Thomson Carswell, 2003) (looseleaf updated 2008) at 369, quoted in Spraytech, supra
note 71 at para 18.
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compliance” should be the test used to determine whether a municipal by-law
could be complied with alongside empowering legislation. This test establishes
that provincial legislation should not be deemed to be inoperative simply because
it legislates in the same area as another government.74 In framing municipalities
and their authority, the SCC stated that “municipalities as statutory bodies may
exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those powers necessarily
or fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those indispensable
powers essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation of the purposes
of the corporation.”75 However, the SCC acknowledged the important
representative role of local governments: “Whatever rules of construction are
applied they must not be used to usurp the legitimate role of municipal bodies
as community representatives.”76 In a different case the SCC also stated that
municipalities “balance complex and divergent interests” in decision-making,
thus warranting that “intra vires decisions of municipalities be reviewed upon a
deferential standard.”77
Later, in United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City),
the SCC considered the right of a city to issue and regulate taxi plate licences.
In this case, there was no explicit reference in the enabling legislation, and the
City was accused of holding a position that was discriminatory and a breach
of Charter rights.78 Justice Bastarache noted the shift in the interpretation of
municipal authority by the courts, stating: “The ‘benevolent’ and ‘strict’
construction dichotomy has been set aside, and a broad and purposive approach
to the interpretation of municipal powers has been embraced.”79 Similarly,
in Croplife Canada v Toronto (City), the Ontario Court of Appeal adopted an
expansive interpretation of municipal authority, stating that general welfare
powers “are to be interpreted broadly and generously within their context and
statutory limits to achieve the legitimate interests of the municipality and its
inhabitants.”80 The Court signalled a shift away from the traditionally restrictive,
74. See BC Lottery Corp v Vancouver (City), 1999 BCCA 18 at para 19. See also Attorney General
for Ontario et al v City of Mississauga (1981), 33 OR (2d) 395 (CA).
75. Spraytech, supra note 71.
76. Ibid at para 23, quoting Shell Canada Products Ltd v Vancouver (City), [1994] 1
SCR 231 at 244.
77. Rascal Trucking, supra note 70 at para 35.
78. United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v Calgary (City), 2004 SCC 19 [Taxi
Drivers] (referenced in R v Latouche, 2010 ABPC 166 at para 72).
79. Ibid at para 6.
80. Croplife Canada v Toronto (City) (2005), 75 OR (3d) 357 at para 37 (CA), leave to appeal to
SCC refused, 31036 (17 November 2005).
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prescribed approach to the interpretation of municipal power in favour of a
broad purposive approach.81 As held in R v Guignard:
This Court has often reiterated the social and political importance of local
governments. It has stressed that their powers must be given a generous
interpretation because their closeness to the members of the public who live or work
on their territory make them more sensitive to the problems experienced by those
individuals.82

Recently, in Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, the SCC was unwavering
that the Constitution is to be applied with the principle of “co-operative
federalism” with a clear place for municipalities. The SCC explained co-operative
federalism as follows:
The division of powers, one of the basic components of federalism, was designed
to uphold … diversity within a single nation. Broad powers were conferred on
provincial legislatures, while at the same time Canada’s unity was ensured by
reserving to Parliament powers better exercised in relation to the country as a whole.
Each head of power was assigned to the level of government best placed to exercise
the power. The fundamental objectives of federalism were, and still are, to reconcile
unity with diversity, promote democratic participation by reserving meaningful
powers to the local or regional level and to foster co-operation among governments
and legislatures for the common good.83

The case established that municipalities, “as being the closest level to affected
citizens, should be given recognition in their” decision-making.84 In so doing,
the SCC applied the language of the Constitution as a “living tree”85 that must
be “tailored to the changing political and cultural realities of Canadian society,”
and “continually be reassessed in light of the fundamental values it was designed
to serve.”86 Constitutional doctrines are thus used to balance the overlap of rules
made by governments, reconcile diversity, and ensure sufficient predictability
in the operation of powers.87 The principle of co-operative federalism decries
having “watertight compartments” within which governments may act, leaving
an important role for municipalities as stewards of the local community.88
81. Galganov v Russell (Township), 2012 ONCA 409, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 34965 (6
December 2012).
82. R v Guignard, 2002 SCC 14 at para 17.
83. Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 22 [Canadian Western Bank].
84. Toronto (City) v Goldlist Properties Inc (2002), 58 OR (3d) 232 at para 35 (SC Div Ct).
85. Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada (1929), [1930] AC 124 (PC) at 136.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. See e.g. Canadian Western Bank, supra note 83; Multiple Access Ltd v McCutheon, [1982]
2 SCR 161; Law Society of British Columbia v Mangat, 2001 SCC 67; OPSEU v Ontario,
[1987] 2 SCR 2.
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As explained by the SCC, co-operative federalism incorporates a number of
doctrines, including subsidiarity, which serve as an important component in the
interpretation of municipal action.89 The principle of subsidiarity was invoked
to support judicial deference to municipal decision-making.90 The SCC first
mentioned the principle of subsidiarity in Spraytech. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé,
writing for the majority in favour of a less stringent interpretation of
municipal power, stated:
The case arises in an era in which matters of governance are often examined through
the lens of the principle of subsidiarity. This is the proposition that law-making and
implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not only
effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their
needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population diversity.91

The SCC considers subsidiarity as a principle when interpreting municipal
action.92 In a four-four decision on the proper application of the principle, the
SCC held that subsidiarity operates as a principle affirming that “legislative
action is to be taken by the government that is closest to the citizen and is thus
considered to be in the best position to respond to the citizen’s concerns,” but
does not override the status of municipalities as creatures of the province.93
Subsidiarity does not mandate that all governmental decisions must be taken
at particular level of government, closest to the affected parties or not, nor does
it suggest a re-reading of constitutional division of powers.94 As Justice LeBel
cautioned in Spraytech, courts should not interpret a generous interpretation
of municipal authority as license to “invent municipal authority where none
exists.”95 Lower-court decisions echo Justice LeBel’s conclusion that municipal
89. See Canadian Western Bank, supra note 83 at paras 42-43. The case held that
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, a strict interpretation of constitutional powers,
is inconsistent with these constitutional doctrines. These doctrines and principles include the
pith and substance doctrine, the double aspect doctrine, the necessarily incidental or ancillary
doctrine, the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, the doctrine of paramountcy, and the
doctrine of subsidiarity.
90. Spraytech, supra note 71.
91. Ibid at paras 3-4. See also Canadian Western Bank, supra note 83 at para 45.
92. Note that Spraytech, supra note 71, did not consider whether a bylaw was passed for a
municipal purpose, but instead focused on whether: (1) the bylaw was implicitly authorized
by an omnibus provision; and (2) the municipality was preempted from regulating pesticides
because a provincial enactment occupied the field. There remains a debate as to whether
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé considered subsidiarity in one or both of these questions.
93. Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra note 51 at paras 72 and 183.
94. Canada Post Corporation v Hamilton (City), 2016 ONCA 767 at para 85.
95. Spraytech, supra note 71 at 366.
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authority cannot be imbued absent provincial authority; while subsidiarity
imports into case law respect for municipalities as governments to be seen as
representative of their constituents, the principle does not grant authority where
none exists in provincial statute.96
The principle of subsidiarity, however, does provide two particularly useful
tools to help understand municipal authority: First, it cements the view that
municipalities should be conceptualized as democratic governments that make
decisions on behalf of their citizens.97 Second, read together with co-operative
federalism, the principle asks for consistency and clarity in interpreting the
actions of governments. Constitutional doctrines anticipate overlap in the rules
made by governments and try to make sense of whether the rules can work
together or not.98 The next section turns to this very question in the context of
legislation, specifically examining how subsidiarity can help to make sense of
municipal power where numerous pieces of provincial legislation overlap without
consistency or clarity.

III. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY AND LEGISLATIVE DESIGN: THE
CASE OF TORONTO’S WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW
In the European Union, subsidiarity is a political principle, invoked to elaborate
the basic political character of municipalities.99 The EU application includes
legislative provisions that empower municipalities, in contrast to Canada,
where subsidiarity has been invoked by the courts. However, while the courts
have introduced principles to help guide determinations of municipal authority,
practical questions remain as to the extent municipalities can act given an overlap
of provincial legislation that can complicate municipal authority.
A. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY AND LEGISLATIVE DESIGN

Alongside judicial decisions, provincial legislation has modified the scope of
municipal authority across the country. As C.J. Williams and John Mascarin state:

96. See Friends of Lansdowne Inc v Ottawa (City), 2012 ONCA 273 at para 14; Ontario
Restaurant Hotel & Motel Association v Toronto (2005), 202 OAC 395 at para 3; Spraytech,
supra note 71 at paras 21, 26; Wainfleet Wind Energy Inc v Township of Wainfleet, 2013
ONSC 2194; Eng v Toronto (City), 2012 ONSC 6818; Magder v Ford, 2013 ONSC 1842.
97. Makuch, Craik & Leisk, supra note 4 at 110.
98. Edwards, supra note 85.
99. Levi & Valverde, supra note 3 at 424.
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[W]hile the old prescriptive model has not totally been eradicated, the new statute
signifies a willingness on the part of the province to provide local government
with greater autonomy, latitude and flexibility, which of course has been balanced
by provincial control mechanisms, the most obvious of which is the rampant
regulation-making authority incorporated throughout the legislation.100

The authors suggest that the legislative changes are not revolutionary, but
are “a significant step in the right direction for municipalities by replacing the
concept of prescriptive delegation with a new model based on broad and flexible
grants of authority that are balanced with various control measures to ensure
public accessibility and participation as well as municipal accountability and
transparency.”101 Over the last two decades, provinces across the country have
given more expansive powers to large municipalities, including more options for
raising revenue102 and in relation to housing.103
FIGURE 1 -INVENTORY OF LAWS AND RULES

100. CJ Williams & John Mascarin, Ontario Municipal Act 2001 and Commentary (Toronto:
Butterworth’s, 2002) at 40-41.
101. Ibid.
102. Municipal Government Act, RSO 1990, c M-45.
103. Charter of Ville de Montréal, CQLR c C-11.4, Schedule I.
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But, in practice, Canadian cities are subject to numerous restrictions, ranging
from the mechanisms it may use to raise revenue to the levies of tow truck
drivers.104 Figure 1 provides an inventory of the laws and institutions applicable
to Toronto’s legal authority.105 This image illustrates the complex overlapping of
rules that govern municipal jurisdiction. As interpreted by the courts, provinces
have broad authority to enact legislation that affects municipalities, especially
when it comes to the organization of municipal institutions. In Toronto, for
example, the Province of Ontario introduced city-specific legislation called the
City of Toronto Act, 2006 that gave the city more expansive powers to self-govern in
matters within its jurisdiction, including section 8, which grants broad discretion
to the city to pass laws related to “health, safety and well-being of persons.”106
Although the City of Toronto Act, 2006 has been likened to the home rule status
of some American cities, which gives jurisdiction over areas of responsibility such
as education, zoning, and planning, Toronto’s powers fall short and the province
has retained its power to override the municipality’s decisions.107
Ontario has also introduced numerous other pieces of legislation that impact
the decision-making powers of local governments, including the Planning Act,108
the Local Planning Tribunals Appeals Act,109 the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act,110
the Municipal Elections Act, 1996,111 and the Municipal Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act.112 This overlap of legislation complicates the actions

104. City of Toronto Act, supra note 6, s 8(2)(6).
105. Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Streets: City Governance in an Age of Diversity
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) at 21 and 28. The visual representation is an
adaptation of Valverde’s “legal inventory of laws,” which aims to provide an overview of the
“basic legal architecture” engaged in particular disputes.
106. Friends of Landsdowne Inc v Ottawa (City), 2012 ONCA 273 at para 23.
107. Levi & Valverde, supra note 3 at 454-55.
108. Planning Act, RSO 1990, c P.13.
109. Ontario Municipal Board Act, RSO 1990, c O.28. Please note that at the time of writing,
the Province of Ontario had recently replaced the Act with Bill 139, the Local Planning
Appeal Tribunal Act. This Act would have any effect on matters related to municipal ward
boundaries and, therefore, the analysis in this article.
110. The Ontario Municipal Board Act, RSO 1990 c O.28 was replaced with the Local Planning
Appeals Tribunal Act, SO 2017, c 23 [LPAT]. The changes to do not affect powers related to
municipal boundaries and, therefore, the analysis in this article.
111. Municipal Elections Act, SO 1996, c 32.
112. Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSO 1990, c M-56.
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that municipalities may take.113 I suggest that the principle of subsidiary can and
should assist us with the normative and theoretical development of understanding
municipal power and autonomy. The application of operative subsidiarity asks
how applicable legislative acts, working together, act to ensure consistency in
the articulation of the municipal role. I assert that operative subsidiarity should
act as a tool of interpretation at the provincial level in setting out the power of a
municipality to act within a policy area.
B. MUNICIPAL WARD BOUNDARY REVIEWS

Canada does not have a country-wide approach to the timing or process of
electoral boundary reviews, other than at the federal level. Every ten years, federal
commissions are established in each of Canada’s ten provinces to recommend
changes to electoral boundaries. The commissions are independent bodies
and make final decisions as to federal electoral boundaries, with ministers of
Parliament and others taking part in the process equally as consulted parties.114
The province’s chief justice appoints a judge to chair the commission, and the
Speaker of the House of Commons appoints the other two members from
among the province’s residents. The commissions are “radically” decentralized,
with each of the ten commissions operating independently.115 After engaging
in a public consultation process, each commission submits a report on what it
considered in revising the boundaries and proposing a revised electoral map to
the House of Commons. Each commission then considers any objections and
recommendations from Members of Parliament and prepares a final report, which
outlines the final electoral boundaries for the respective province. The process is
set out in the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act,116 “which was introduced to
address problems associated with electoral redistribution in Canada, such as the

113. While not analyzed in this article, it is worthwhile to note that provincial deference to
municipalities has been inconsistently applied across the country: at times, the province
refuses to endorse municipal decisions. See e.g. Robert Benzie “Kathleen Wynne stopping
John Tory’s plan for tolls on DVP, Gardiner,” The Toronto Star (26 January 2017) <www.
thestar.com/news/queenspark/2017/01/26/kathleen-wynne-stopping-john-torys-plan-fortolls-on-dvp-gardiner.html> [perma.cc/D2JL-57CM]. Other times it defers to them entirely.
See e.g. Morrow, supra note 13.
114. Toronto, City Clerk and City Solicitor, Petition to Redivide Ward Boundaries, (Staff Report
Action Required), (Toronto, 2013), online <www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/cc/bgrd/
backgroundfile-60165.pdf> [perma.cc/3M23-K4P7].
115. Ron Levy, “Regulating Impartiality: Electoral-Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena”
(2008) 53 McGill LJ 1 at 10, 54.
116. Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, RSC 1985, c E-3.
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tendency for the exercise to be overly partisan and the frequent discrepancies in
the geographic size and population of constituencies at the federal level.”117
In contrast, the rules relating to boundary reviews in municipalities differ
strongly by jurisdiction. For example, in London, Ontario, staff are required to
review ward populations each term; in Halifax, wards are considered every eight
years. Ontario municipalities have purportedly broad discretion to determine
the number of wards or electoral districts that they wish to have within their
municipal boundaries. When COTA was enacted, and until legislative changes
were introduced in 2018, Toronto was given authority with respect to establishing,
changing or dissolving wards. COTA clarified this power in section 128(1), where
it states: “Without limiting sections 7 and 8, those sections authorize the City to
divide or re-divide the City into wards or to dissolve the existing wards” and even
eliminate wards altogether. The City—like other Ontario municipalities now—
was empowered to determine its manner of representation, whether through the
election of councillors based on ward, elected at-large, or some combination
of the two. However, a closer look reveals constraints and impediments to the
exercise of this power, notwithstanding the purported freedom given to the city
to regulate this aspect of their affairs.
The City’s authority over its system of representation is dramatically tempered
by other rules. First, COTA empowers 500 electors in the City of Toronto to
petition City Council to pass a bylaw dividing or redividing the City into wards
or dissolving existing wards.118 If the City does not pass a bylaw within 90 days
after receiving the petition, any of the electors may apply to the Local Planning
Appeals Tribunal (LPAT), known until 2018 as the Ontario Municipal Board
(OMB), upon which the LPAT may hear the application and make an order.119
Ironically, city staff estimate that the timeline required for the introduction of
new ward boundaries is at least two years, far more than the 90 days prescribed
117. Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc, The Davidson Group Inc, and
Thomas Ostler, “Toronto ward boundary review: background research report” (2014) at 3,
online: <www.drawthelines.ca> [perma.cc/QG9W-USPW] [Boundary Review].
118. City of Toronto Act, 2006 as it appeared on September 2018, supra note 6, s 129(3) defines
“elector” as “a person whose name appears on the voters’ list, as amended up until the close
of voting on voting day, for the last regular election preceding a petition being presented to
council under subsection (1).”
119. In 2018, the Province of Ontario enacted the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal Act, 2017,
SO 2017, c 23, Schedule 1, which changes the name and certain practices and procedures
of the OMB. The new act does not address ward boundary review processes although does
increase deference to City Council decisions. To the date of publication, there have been no
considerations by the LPAT of municipal WBR changes. Note that a fulsome application of
these changes to WBR processes is not considered in this article.
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in the Act.120 This means that while the process for conducting a ward boundary
review is long and complex with years of work and numerous required rounds
of public consultation, when Toronto undertook its WBR it could be appealed
to and overturned by the OMB.121 Second, while neither COTA nor the city’s
procedural by-law set out the process that must be followed to designate new
ward boundaries, the legislation does require that the powers of the City be
exercised by City Council.122 A strict reading of the legislation implies that an
independent body like the federal commission would not be able to make the
final decision on the placement of ward boundaries, although the City has never
tried nor tested this approach.
Third, municipalities are subject to quasi-judicial constraints relating to
boundary-making. As political scientist Andrew Sancton notes, there are no SCC
decisions that apply to the drawing of municipal boundaries and, indeed, the
courts have specifically provided that the principles that apply to the federal and
provincial governments do not apply to municipalities.123 In practice, as a result of
OMB pronouncements, Ontario municipalities have observed the common-law
requirements related to electoral districts set out in the landmark Supreme
Court of Canada case, Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), known
colloquially as the “Carter case.”124 This case considered the meaning of the
“right to vote” in section 3 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 3
grants every citizen the right to “vote in an election of members of the House of
Commons or a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.”
The case was brought by lawyer and resident Rogers Carter, who observed that
the electoral boundaries (or ridings) approved in the Province of Saskatchewan
led to significant deviations in population across the province. The result was
that, “a single vote in the smaller riding carried 63.5% more electoral weight than
a single vote in the larger riding.”125

120. City Manager, “A ward boundary review for Toronto,” Staff Report to Executive Committee
(2013), online: <www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-58333.pdf>
[perma.cc/YFJ6-2SP6] at 4.
121. Ibid at 3.
122. City of Toronto Act, 2006, supra note 6.
123. Andrew Sancton, “Commentary” in John C Courtney, Peter MacKinnon & David E Smith,
eds, Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral Boundaries (Saskatoon: Fifth
House Publishers, 1992) 90 at 92.
124. Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 SCR 158 [Carter].
125. David Johnson, “Canadian Electoral Boundaries and Courts: Practices, Principles and
Problems” (1994) 39 McGill LJ 224 at 227.
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In affirming that there may be population differences across ridings, the SCC
clarified that voter parity was the only measure to assess effective representation,
but not the only criterion by which boundaries should be evaluated.
In considering electoral boundaries, the first criterion is that approximately
the same numbers of voters are represented in each electoral area, a criterion
known as “voter parity.” However, to achieve “effective representation,” other
criteria are also important, namely geography, community history, community
interests, minority representation, and other factors.126 These other criteria
justify a departure from strict voter parity; however, the courts have said that
the population of each electoral district should not deviate by more than 25
percent. The result is that provincial authority effectively empowers the LPAT or,
at the time of Toronto’s WBR, the OMB, to decide whether municipalities have
fulfilled the SCC principles. However, unlike the courts, quasi-judicial decisions
do not follow stare decisis, meaning that adjudicators are not bound by previous
LPAT or OMB decisions. Therefore, for any municipality undertaking a WBR,
it is important to navigate a complex compendium of past cases. Because LPAT
or OMB decisions are not binding on subsequent hearings, there is no single set
of prescribed rules that municipalities must follow to prevent the tribunal from
overturning a WBR.
Any WBR process in Ontario is a legal minefield, with broad principles but
no clear rules guiding potential for residents to appeal proposed boundaries.
Contestations to the meaning of the term “communities of interest” illustrate
the degree to which the OMB intervened in WBRs in the past. For example,
in Kingston’s 2013 WBR process, City Council’s decision was appealed to the
OMB on the basis that it did not provide effective representation, in part because
the by-law failed to recognize “communities of interest” by splitting up an area
represented by a single neighbourhood association.127 The OMB sided with the
appellant and amended the by-law to account for the Syndenham Neighbourhood
Association.128 In Kitchener, the city’s 34 neighbourhood associations were the
“communities of interest” used to inform its ward boundaries.129 So, recognition
of neighbourhoods as “communities of interest” is important to the OMB,
but there are no specific guidelines offered, nor adherence to a municipality’s
interpretation of the term. Likewise, the OMB has stated that ward boundary
decisions will be amended or repealed only if there is a compelling reason to do
126.
127.
128.
129.

Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), supra note 125.
Boundary Review, supra note 118 at 24–25.
Ibid at 25.
Ibid at 16.
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so.130 But, in practice, the OMB has overturned WBRs in cities such as Ottawa
after several years of community consultations, reports, and decision-making
only to have the city restart the process or accept the OMB’s ward design.131
The next section outlines the case study of Toronto’s ward boundary review to
explain how the notion of operative subsidiarity can be used to clarify municipal
authority in Canada.
C. TORONTO’S WARD BOUNDARY REVIEW

Wards are deeply entrenched in the governance models of most Canadian
municipalities, including Toronto, as vehicles for representative democracy. The
2013 WBR was Toronto’s first municipal-led ward boundary review since the
city’s amalgamation in 1998. When the review began, the populations of Toronto’s
wards were widely unequal, with some wards having twice the population of
others.132 For example, ward 18 (in the former City of Toronto) and ward 29 (in
the former Borough of East York) each contained fewer than 45,000 residents,
approximately half of the population of ward 23 (in the former City of North
York), which had almost 90,000 residents.
In June 2013, City Council approved a WBR process.133 A strong impetus
for the review was that the dangerously low threshold of having 500 citizens
petition City Council to pass a by-law dividing or redividing the city into wards
or dissolving existing wards, upon which the OMB could hear and make an order
imposing new boundaries.134 COTA also requires that City Council must make
final decisions on all but a handful of delegated powers. To city staff, this meant
that the decision on ward boundaries could not be delegated to an independent
commission akin to the federal process. Instead, city staff recommended that
consultants be retained to conduct the review, independent from staff and
councillors. The objective was to keep the process at arm’s-length from the City
130. Hambly, Re, 64 OMBR 36 at para 8; Teno v Lakeshore (Town), 51 OMBR 473 at para 36.
131. Ottawa (City) v Osgoode Rural Community Assn, 45 OMBR 129.
132. Alexandra Flynn, “(Re)creating Boundary Lines: Assessing Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review
Process” in IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance and Governance (2017) at 5, online:
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/81191/1/imfgpaper_no32_torontowbr_
aflynn_june_22_2017.pdf> citing Zack Taylor, Analysis and Commentary: City of Toronto
Ward Boundary Review (2012).
133. Toronto, City Clerk, Committee Decision on Final Report – Toronto Ward Boundary
Review, (Executive Committee Decision), (2016), online <app.Toronto.ca/tmmis/
viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2016.EX15.2> [Committee Decision].
134. City of Toronto Act, supra note 6, s 129(3). This section defines “elector” as “a person whose
name appears on the voters’ list, as amended up to the close of voting on voting day, for the
last regular election preceding a petition being presented to council under subsection (1).”
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Manager’s Office, who would oversee the WBR, while the consultants would
make the final recommendations. Careful attention was placed on avoiding
language that would limit the consultants’ options, in particular by setting out
in advance the number of wards, which was the factor that led to the OMB’s
rejection of Ottawa’s WBR a few years earlier.135
COTA constrained Toronto’s ability to design a WBR that emulated the
federal government’s arm’s length process given COTA’s limits to delegation.
As a result, councillors played an especially important role in the WBR. The
WBR process was designed by staff and approved by the Executive Committee
and City Council. Staff recommended a process that involved hiring external
consultants to develop a set of recommendations, following extensive public
and stakeholder consultations, which would then go to Executive Committee
and City Council for approval.136 Staff advised councillors that the OMB could
overturn City Council’s WBR process and decision if the review were overly
limited or prescribed, so the hope was that this fear would further protect the
process from undue political influence.137 City councillors were interviewed at
the start of the process, following the designation of the ward boundary options,
and again towards the end of the review process.138 In the first consultation stage,
the consultants individually interviewed all forty-four members of the 2010-2014
City Council and seven new 2014-2018 Members of Council to solicit their
perspective on the issues related to the current Toronto ward configuration.139
In stage 2, the consultants had meetings with forty-two members of Council and
three members of the Mayor’s staff.
In short, the WBR illustrated a top-down, constrained process. City
councillors were the ultimate decision-makers both in the final decision and in
the creation of the process.140 Under one section of COTA, Toronto had full
power to steward the WBR process; as a result of another, Toronto could not
135. Committee Decision, supra note 134.
136. Interview of City of Toronto Staff Member #4 (7 May 2016) conducted by author in City
Manager’s Office (Toronto, Ontario, Canada).
137. Interview of City of Toronto Staff Member #1 (18 December 2015) conducted by author in
City Manager’s Office (Toronto, Ontario, Canada).
138. Canadian Urban Institute, Beate Bowron Etcetera Inc, The Davidson Group Inc,
& Thomas Ostler, “Toronto ward boundary review: final report” (May 2016),
online: <www.static1.squarespace.com/static/53bc0914e4b0eb57996e4dee/
t/5739fe5022482e97a8591392/1463418450864/ TWBRFinalReportMay2016.pdf>.
139. Ibid at 7.
140. Committee Decision, supra note 134. see also City Clerk and City Solicitor, Staff Report
to City Council: A Ward Boundary Review for Toronto, City of Toronto (2013), online:
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.EX32.2>.
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introduce a model led by an independent commission, as adopted at the federal
level. The OMB had the power to step in and determine ward boundaries based
on the application of 500 electors, with the quasi-tribunal’s decisions offering
little guidance on how to construct a process free of scrutiny. Thus, the City of
Toronto had to craft its process to fit within the narrow confines of legislative
constraints, with a disproportionately privileged role for councillors. In the
end, Toronto’s deliberate, careful process succeeded and was upheld by the
OMB on appeal, based on the appropriate application of the Carter decision,
and in particular the “effective representation” of the resulting 47 wards.141
In its 2-1 decision on 15 December, 2017, the OMB upheld Toronto’s WBR,
stating that, “[Toronto’s] ward structure delineated in the By-laws provides for
effective representation and corrects the current population imbalance amongst
the existing 44 wards. The decision made by Council to adopt the By-laws was
defensible, fair and reasonable.”142
D. PROVINCIAL OVERRIDE OF TORONTO’S WARD BOUNDARIES

Toronto’s election period for the statutorily scheduled municipal election
commenced on 1 May, 2018.143 Thousands of candidates signed up in the first
two months of the race, with a record number of historically marginalized vying
for councillor positions.144 On 7 June 2018, the Conservative party won a
majority of seats in the provincial legislature and Doug Ford, a previous Toronto
councillor, became the premier. The next month, Premier Ford announced that
one of the first acts of the new government would be the reduction in the number
of City of Toronto wards from 47 to 25, and the boundaries would match those
of the federal electoral districts. Toronto’s mayor had a tepid response to the
provincial decision.145 Bill 5, The Better Local Government Act, was enacted in law
on 14 August, 2018 and, as promised, amended the City of Toronto Act, 2006
by reducing the size of city council to 25.146 Several candidates for city council,
mainly women and historically marginalized people, challenged Bill 5, as did the

141.
142.
143.
144.

Di Ciano v Toronto (City), 2017 CanLII 85757 at para 20.
Ibid at para 51.
Municipal Elections Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 32, s 10.1(3).
City of Toronto et al v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONSC 5151 at para 31 [City of
Toronto et al].
145. See Alexandra Flynn, “The legal case against Ford’s assault on local democracy,”
Spacing Magazine (30 July 2018): online: <www.spacing.ca/toronto/2018/07/30/
the-legal-case-against-fords-assault-on-local-democracy/> [https://perma.cc/7L2J-7J6G].
146. The Better Local Government Act, SO 2018, c 11.
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City of Toronto, once empowered to do so by City Council.147 On 10 September,
2018, Superior Court Justice Edward Belobaba found that Bill 5 “substantially
interfered with both the candidate’s and the voter’s right to freedom of expression
as guaranteed under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”
and could not be saved under section 1.148 In a whirlwind decision, following
the government’s threat that they would invoke the notwithstanding clause
to override Justice Belobaba’s decision, the Court of Appeal later granted the
Province of Ontario’s request for a stay, with the result that the election moved
forward under a 25-ward model.149
The Court of Appeal decision is pending, with numerous grounds of appeal
possible outside of Charter section 2(b), including unwritten constitutional
principles and the applicability of Charter section 3 to municipalities.150 Amongst
the issues that may be considered by the courts is the question of subsidiarity.
In particular, how the notion of municipalities as “creatures of the province”
nests with the increasing amount of deference granted to local governments
as democratic bodies and their integral role as actors within the principle of
cooperative federalism. An appellate decision on the merits may also resolve
critical questions of subsidiarity in the drawing of electoral boundaries. If so,
the Court could further resolve decades of jurisprudence that both asserts a
co-operative federalism that includes a respectful role for municipalities and
upholds provincial authority over municipalities.
E.

OPERATIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND MUNICIPAL WARD BOUNDARIES

What would an application of the principle of subsidiary mean for the WBR
process and for municipal authority more broadly? The Constitution Act
articulates that the powers of municipalities fall within the responsibility of the
province. Provinces can set out a prescriptive, hierarchical model or grant broad
powers to municipalities to make decisions within their spheres of jurisdiction.151
As Blank writes, “it is precisely the fact that federalism as a principle has nothing
to say about cities that causes the neglect of constitutional protection to cities in
most federal constitutions.”152 By contrast, under the principle of subsidiarity,
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

City of Toronto et al, supra note 145.
Ibid at para 10.
Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2018 ONCA 761.
Ibid at para 2.
Nicholas Blomley, “Introduction” in Irus Braverman et al, eds, The Expanding Spaces of Law:
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cities are important because of their unique location of human association. The
bottom line is that it is human connection felt at the localized level that has
reinforced the importance of municipal forms of government.153 The SCC has
invoked subsidiarity alongside the principle of co-operative federalism, which
recognizes municipalities as distinct governments that are empowered to act on
behalf of their citizens.
However, the actual powers of municipalities are complicated by the overlap
of provincial legislation, which blurs the scale at which decisions are to be made.
Even before the provincial government introduced Bill 5, Toronto’s WBR process
proceeded both under COTA’s constraints and in fear of OMB appeal. At the
time of the WBR, COTA purportedly gave full autonomy to Toronto to decide
its WBR process, yet the province also granted the OMB the power to override
municipal ward decisions and substitute its own version. The construct of
empowerment is significantly limited, calling into question how much power the
city actually had. The WBR process was designed to comply with provincial laws
that forced the city to design a careful process that could withstand OMB scrutiny,
and yet limited Toronto’s capacity to adopt a process that was arms-length from
City Council, such as the federal commission model, which seeks to prevent
gerrymandering. The result in Toronto was a WBR process that heavily relied on
the input and buy-in of councillors, calling into question how independent the
decision was from the self-interested will of these elected actors. This unintended
consequence cannot possibly be what the province had in mind.
A framework of operative subsidiarity would help to clarify the interpretation
of municipal authority. Operative subsidiarity draws attention to the question
of consistency in scale and jurisdiction. In the context of ward boundaries, for
example, Bill 5 is not a single provincial bill that overrides the City of Toronto’s
decision in the creation of its electoral districts. Instead, it is part of a larger narrative
of the provincial government’s lack of comfort in municipalities as having full
autonomy in the drawing of ward boundaries. Operative subsidiarity illuminates
that Toronto was always constrained, through various legal instruments, in having
full authority to create its wards, based on COTA provisions and the oversight
function of the OMB. Seen through the lens of operative subsidiarity, the City of
Toronto had to maneuver amongst various legislative provisions, impacting both
the process and outcome.
Operative subsidiarity would improve consistency and clarity in municipal
legislation. There are two plausible routes in its application. First, operative
153. See e.g. Jerry Frug, “The Geography of Community” (1996) 48 Stan L Rev 1047 at 1055;
Frug, supra note 9.
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subsidiarity, as a tool of legislative design, would require provinces to determine
how various pieces of legislation work together to empower local governments.
In the context of the WBR, prior to the enactment of Bill 5, where applications
of the Charter and overlapping pieces of legislation muddle the autonomy
purportedly granted by the province, municipalities could focus their query on
how such laws are meant to co-exist. If enacted by the province as an interpretation
tool, this would facilitate the interpretation of current enabling statutes in
favour of fulsome municipality authority. Second, operative subsidiarity could
be adopted as a guiding principle for quasi-judicial interpretation of municipal
action. Like subsidiarity, it could be applied alongside other constitutional
principles to recognize municipalities as distinct governments representative of
their constituents in situations like the WBR where multiple pieces of legislation
complicate municipal authority.

IV. CONCLUSION
This article contributes to the conversation on how the principle of subsidiarity
can be operationalized when provinces craft municipal authority. It does not seek
to offer an ambitious theory of municipal authority, but, instead, offers a modest
lens upon which provincial laws concerning local power can be streamlined for
consistency. As Berman writes, “[t]he line-drawing problems are potentially
difficult and often politically contested, but even just the habits of mind generated
by thinking in terms of subsidiarity can help ensure that lawmaking communities
at least take into account other potentially relevant lawmaking communities.”154
Kong agrees, stating that the acknowledgement of other forms of government is
the principle strength of subsidiarity.155 Thus, consideration of the municipal scale
is the way in which subsidiarity can be operationalized; in particular, by invoking
the principle to understand the implications of multiple laws that may constrain
the effective policy-making power of local governments.
Operative subsidiarity looks first to the matter to be addressed and then
designs how that scale can be empowered to act.156 The municipality may not
in fact be the right scale. The benefit, however, is to design a model that makes
sense, is consistent, and which achieves legitimacy.157 Operative subsidiarity
provides a workable basis for legislative design. In the case of the WBR, operative
154.
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subsidiarity offers a means of observing the patchwork of legislation that seems
to simultaneously grant power yet undermines municipal autonomy, and which
limits the extent to which the city may devise a WBR approach that can achieve
policy aims in an accountable process. Instead, the province should start by
querying the right scale of authority, then re-imagining electoral design policy
with clear, enabling legislation. Without it, we are left with a WBR process—and
municipal policy generally—that does not achieve the fundamental objective of
representative democracy and uncertainty in respect of municipal authority.

